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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-FREEDOM OF THE PRESS-
THE CONTINUING PROBLEM OF PRIOR RESTRAINTS
In the fall of 1970, a trial by jury was about to commence in the
Snohomish County Superior Court, Everett, Washington, for two young
men charged with the crime of murder in the first degree. Pursuant to
the procedure authorized by a provision of the Revised Code of Wash-
ington,' the defendants, the prosecuting attorney and the court agreed
that the jury need not be sequestered during the trial. Since extensive
press coverage of the proceedings was anticipated, the trial judge found
it necessary to issue a pre-trial order which, among other things, limited
reports of the proceedings by the news media to those events which
transpired in open court and in the presence of the judge, jury, court
reporter, defendants and counsel for all parties. 2 Sam Sperry and Dee
Norton, two newspaper reporters assigned to cover the trial, wrote an
article summarizing the events of an evidence hearing that was con-
ducted in the absence of the jury, including therein portions of testimony
ruled inadmissible at the hearing by the court.3 The trial judge deter-
mined that the article, which had appeared in two editions of the
Seattle Times, 4 constituted a violation of his pre-trial order, and found
the reporters in contempt of court. The reporters took an appeal to
the Washington Supreme Court on the ground that the pre-trial order
was an unconstitutional infringement upon their first amendment rights. 5
The judgment of contempt was vacated unanimously by that court on
1. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 10.49.110 (1961) provides: "Juries in criminal
cases shall not be allowed to separate, except by consent of the defendant and the
prosecuting attorney, but shall be kept together, without meat or drink, unless
otherwise ordered by the court, to be furnished at the expense of the county."
2. State ex rel. Superior Court of Snohomish County v. Sperry, 79 Wash. 2d 69,
-, 483 P.2d 608, 609 (1971). That part of the pre-trial order referred to in the
text reads as follows: "2. No court proceedings shall be reported upon or dis-
seminated to the public by any form of news media, including, but not limited to
newspaper, magazine, radio and television coverage, except those proceedings oc-
curring in open Court in the presence of the Judge, jury, court reporter, de-
fendants and counsel for all parties. No report shall be made by such news media
in any event of matters of testimony ruled inadmissible or stricken by the trial
judge at the time of the offer of the matter or testimony."
3. Id. at -, 483 P.2d at 609-11, where the article in question is reprinted in
its entirety.
4. Seattle Times, Oct. 29, 1970, at col. 4 (4th and 5th ed.).
5. Brief for Appellants at 9.
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April 8, 1971. State ex rel. Superior Court of Snohomish County v.
Sperry, 79 Wash. 2d 69, 483 P.2d 608 (1971), cert. denied, No. 71-324
(U.S., Nov. 9, 1971).
It is the objective of this note to present a brief historical outline of
the overall constitutional problem involved in Sperry, to familiarize the
reader with the legal reasoning used by the Washington Supreme Court
in arriving at its decision, and to survey the recent major decisions
which have dealt with various aspects of the constitutional problem in-
volved. Ultimately, detailed consideration will be given to Sperry's
future implications.
Mr. Justice Black, speaking for the majority in a case before the
United States Supreme Court in 1941,0 noted that "[f]ree speech and
fair trials are two of the most cherished policies of our civilization, and
it would be a trying task to choose between them."'7 The factual pat-
tern in Sperry, as it relates to the newspaper article reporting on ex-
cluded evidence while the jury was being allowed to separate, reveals
a classic example of conflict between these two constitutional concepts.
The Washington court was faced with the "trying task" of having to
choose between them. A better understanding of the Sperry decision
may be had if one has some historical perspective of the constitutional
problems that are involved in the case.
Freedom of speech and of the press are two of the rights guaranteed
by the first amendment of the United States Constitution.8 The right
to a fair trial for one accused of a criminal offense is guaranteed by
the sixth amendment. 9 Since these rights became a part of the Con-
stitution upon the adoption of the Bill of Rights,10 they have always
6. Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252 (1941).
7. Id. at 260.
8. U.S. Const. amend. I reads in part: "Congress shall make no law ...
abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press. ...."
9. U.S. Const. amend. VI reads in part: "In all criminal prosecutions, the
accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of
the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed ...."
Technically, the popular description of the sixth amendment guarantees as the
right of an accused to a "fair" trial is a misnomer. Nowhere in the Constitution
or in its amendments is found a provision which entitles one accused of a crime
to a "fair" trial. Rather, the sixth amendment speaks in terms of a "speedy" and
"public" trial by an "impartial jury." For a more detailed discussion of this point
and for an exhaustive survey of the rights guaranteed by both the first and the
sixth amendments, see Dale, First and Sixth Amendments: Can They Co-Exist?,
37 TENN. L. REV. 209 (1969).
10. The Bill of Rights is the term used to describe the first ten amendments to
the U.S. Constitution.
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been protected from federal abuse under our dual system of law. The
Supreme Court of the United States has, through the due process clause,
gradually incorporated these rights into the fourteenth amendment;'1 as
a result, they are now protected from state abuse as well. 12
The constitutional conflict outlined in Sperry, today most commonly
referred to as the "fair trial-free speech controversy" or the "trial by
newspaper dilemma,"' s has presented a continuing problem,14 which
11. U.S. Const. amend. XIV reads in part: "[Nior shall any State deprive
any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to
any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."
12. The first amendment freedoms were initially applied to the states by way of
dictum in Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925), where, although affirming a
conviction for violation of a state statute prohibiting the advocacy of criminal an-
archy, the Court declared at 666: "For present purposes we may and do assume
that freedom of speech and of the press-which are protected by the First Amend-
ment from abridgement by Congress-are among the fundamental personal rights
and 'liberties' protected by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
from impairment by the States." This dictum became accepted doctrine as to
freedom of speech when, two years later, in Fiske v. Kansas, 274 U.S. 380
(1927), the Court invalidated a state law on the ground that it abridged freedom
of speech contrary to the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.
Freedom of the press was the next to be incorporated into the fourteenth amend-
ment by the Court in Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931); subsequent deci-
sions brought the other first amendment freedoms within its protection. De Jonge
v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353 (1937); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940)
(peaceable assembly and religion, respectively).
The Court incorporated the sixth amendment guarantees into the fourteenth
amendment, thus making them applicable to the states, in the following decisions:
In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257 (1948) (right to a "public" trial); Gideon v. Wain-
wright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (right to "assistance of counsel"); Pointer v. Texas,
380 U.S. 400 (1965) (right to "confront opposing witnesses"); Klopfer v. North
Carolina, 386 U.S. 213 (1967) (right to a "speedy" trial); Washington v. Texas,
388 U.S. 14 (1967) (right to "compulsory process for obtaining witnesses");
and Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968) (right to "trial by jury").
13. Citation of authority on this point is hardly necessary. The use of these
terms by courts reviewing criminal convictions on the basis of prejudicial pub-
licity, as well as by legal writers who subsequently comment on these decisions, is
most commonplace today. One need only leaf through the advance sheets to
state or federal reports or any recent index to legal periodicals under "constitu-
tional law" to see these terms used again and again.
14. Mr. Justice Frankfurter, in a concurring opinion, commented on the fre-
quency and magnitude of this problem in Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717 (1961)
at 730: "Not a Term passes without this Court being importuned to review con-
victions, had in States throughout the country, in which substantial claims are
made that a jury trial has been distorted because of inflammatory newspaper ac-
counts ... exerting pressures upon potential jurors before trial and even during
the course of trial, thereby making it extremely difficult, if not impossible, to
secure a jury capable of taking in, free of prepossessions, evidence submitted
in open court. Indeed such extraneous influences, in violation of the decencies
guaranteed by our Constitution, are sometimes so powerful that an accused is forced
as a practical matter, to forego trial by jury."
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has understandably increased in direct correlation to the rapid expan-
sion and modernization of the communications industry in the United
States.1 5
In earlier times, the magnitude of the problem was negligible simply
because means of communication were scarce, transportation at best was
tedious, and the literacy rate among the general population was minute.
In addition, problems of this nature arose in earlier days only with
trials involving matters of serious and widespread national concern.16
The twentieth century has seen such rapid advances in all these areas
that this type of problem is greatly intensified.' 7
The Sperry court, in ruling that a trial judge may not protect the right
of an accused to a fair trial by limiting press coverage in advance to
only those events which occur in open court and in the presence of the
jury, provided only one answer to a problem that poses many questions.
An analysis of the reasoning used by the majority to arrive at their
decision seems to indicate that the court side-stepped several additional
questions which the case, on its face, appears to raise. This is confirmed
by the concurring opinion which represents the views of three of the
justices on the court.
The state's major argument for affirmance of the contempt conviction
was disposed of early in the decision' 8-the court agreed with appellants
15. See generally Note, Procedural Compromise and Contempt: Feasible Al-
ternatives In the Fair Trial Versus Free Press Controversy, 22 U. FLA. L. REV. 650
(1970).
16. Id. at 651, n.6, where the author refers to such cases as the conspiracy trial
of Aaron Burr and the trial for the assassination of President Lincoln. See,
Burr's Trial, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 470 (1807). See also J. BINGHAM, ARGUMENT OF
J.A. BINGHAM SPECIAL JUDGE ADVOCATE IN REPLY TO DEFENSE OF MARY E.
SURRATT (1865).
17. Consider for a moment the size of the television audience that witnessed the
slaying of Lee Harvey Oswald, President Kennedy's accused assassin, in Dallas,
November, 1963. Add to this the fact that real national concern is no longer a
prerequisite for extensive national coverage of a crime, and one can easily see how
serious legal problems can and do arise.
18. 79 Wash. 2d -, 483 P.2d 608, 611. The state's major contention was
that the reporters were precluded from attacking the constitutionality of the trial
court's pre-trial order because the instant appeal constituted a collateral attack on
that order. As authority for that proposition it cited the case of Walker v. Birming-
ham, 388 U.S. 307 (1967). The court, however, said that Walker did not apply
here because the order being appealed from in that case was not patently invalid,
whereas the order challenged here was void on its face.
At 611, the court cited the following cases as holding that a void order, as dis-
tinguished from a merely erroneous one, may be attacked in a collateral pro-
ceeding: State ex rel. Ewing v. Morris, 120 Wash. 146, 207 P. 18 (1922); State v.
Lew, 25 Wash. 2d 854, 172 P.2d 289 (1946); State ex rel. Sowers v. Olwell, 64
1972]
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that the precise legal issue raised was "[w]hether a newspaper may
constitutionally be proscribed from reporting to the public those events
which occur during an open and public court proceeding."' 19 Since the
court had earlier in the decision decided that violation of an order void
on its face could not support a judgment of contempt, 20 a negative re-
sponse to this question could only result in a reversal of the contempt
convictions. Limiting its decision to the facts of the case, the court
found that the pre-trial order by the trial judge was patently void be-
cause it imposed unjustified limitations on the reporters' constitutional
rights of freedom of speech.
The court premised its decision on a state constitutional provision
providing for the following: "Administration of Justice. Justice in all
cases shall be administered openly, and without unnecessary delay."''1
This provision, the court noted, mandated an open hearing in the mur-
der trial, and immediately put into effect another state constitutional
provision which reads: "Freedom of Speech. Every person may freely
speak, write and publish on all subjects, being responsible for the abuse
of that right."'22  The court also relied on the first amendment to the
United States Constitution which provides in part: "Congress shall make
no law . . .abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press .... 23
The court next considered the validity of prior restraints on the exer-
cise of the first amendment freedom of speech, 2 4 and noted that such
restraints carry with them a presumption of constitutional invalidity,
which can only be overcome by a showing that the limitations imposed
are supported by a different constitutional right which requires the
limitation. 2' The state argued that because the jurors were allowed to
separate, the pre-trial order was necessary to prevent them from being
Wash. 2d 828, 394 P.2d 681 (1964). For the proposition that the violation of an
order patently in excess of the issuing court cannot produce a valid judgment of
contempt, the court cited at 611: In re Berry, 68 Cal. 2d 137, 436 P.2d 273,
65 Cal. Rptr. 273 (1968).
19. 79 Wash. 2d -, 483 P.2d 608, 612.
20. See In re Berry, 68 Cal. 2d 137, 436 P.2d 273, 65 Cal. Rptr. 273 (1968).
21. Wash. Const. art. I. § 10.
22. Wash. Const. art. I, § 5.
23. 79 Wash. 2d -, 483 P.2d 608, 612.
24. Id., where the court cited Schneider v. Town of Irvington, 308 U.S. 147
(1939) and Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943) as authority for the
proposition that injunctions which constitute prior restraints on speech violate the
principles of the first amendment and are applicable to the states by virtue of
the fourteenth amendment.
25. 79 Wash. 2d -, 483 P.2d 608, 612.
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prejudiced while outside the courtroom. This contention was based on
the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment, 26 which incor-
porates the sixth amendment's guarantee of a fair trial to one accused
of a criminal offense.2 7  The court rejected this argument and pointed
out that it was not necessary for the trial judge to allow the jury to
separate in the first place;28 but, this having been done, an appropriate
and adequate instruction had been issued by the judge warning the
jurors of the dangers inherent in allowing them to separate during the
course of the murder trial. 29
The court summarized the discussion on prior restraints with short
references to two United States Supreme Court decisions which dealt
with the problem,3 0 and determined that the judiciary cannot edit, sup-
press, or censor from the public events which occur in open court pro-
ceedings under circumstances such as those found in Sperry.3 1 The court
concluded with the following:
If restraints upon the exercise of First Amendment rights are necessary to preserve
the integrity of the judicial process, then those restraints must be narrowly drawn.
The limitations imposed cannot be greater than is necessary to accomplish the de-
sired constitutional purpose. Dorfman v. Meiszner, 430 F.2d 558 (7th Cir. 1970).
That is not what occurred here. To sustain this judgment of contempt would be to
say that the mere possibility of prejudicial matter reaching a juror outside the court-
room is more important in the eyes of the law than is a constitutionally guaranteed
freedom of expression. This we cannot say.3 2
26. Supra note 11.
27. Supra notes 9 and 11.
28. 79 Wash. 2d -, 483 P.2d 608, 612. Here the court explained in the
following manner the provision in the Revised Code of Washington allowing a jury
to separate: "[Ilt was not necessary to allow the jury to separate. R.C.W.
10.49.110 provides that the court may not allow the jury to separate in a criminal
case without the consent of the defendant and the prosecuting attorney. Under that
statute the parties to a criminal case cannot create the right to a jury separation.
By refusing to consent, the parties prohibit separation; by consenting, they permit
the court to grant a separation. The ultimate decision following the consent of the
parties to a jury separation still rests with the trial court. The fact that the par-
ties here consented to a jury separation did not therefore necessitate a separation."
29. The judge's instruction to the jury is set out in its entirety in the opinion.
Id. -, 483 P.2d at 612-13.
30. Id. at -, 483 P.2d at 613. The references were to: Craig v. Harney,
331 U.S. 367 (1947) where the Court said at 374: "A trial is a public event. . ..
Those who see and hear what transpireEs] can report it with impunity;" and to the
decision in Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532 (1965), where the Court said at 541-2:
"[Rieporters of all media, including television . . . are plainly free to report what-
ever occurs in open court through their respective media."
31. 79 Wash. 2d -, 483 P.2d 608, 613.
32. Id.
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This resulted, of course, in the vacating of the judgment of contempt of
the two reporters.
It is interesting to note that the landmark decision of Sheppard v.
Maxwell 3 was not even referred to in the majority decision, and that
the Estes v. Texas decision was only mentioned in passing, 34 even
though these two decisions dealt extensively with the fair trial-free
speech controversy. This fact moved one of the justices to submit an
exhaustive concurring opinion in which the same result was obtained
using a different route.85
Prior to Sperry in Marshall v. United States,88 petitioner had been
convicted in a federal district court for unlawfully dispensing certain
drugs without a prescription from a licensed physician in violation of
a federal statute.8 7 His appeal was based on the fact that seven jurors
had been exposed to two prejudicial newspaper articles which discussed
matters that the trial judge had not allowed the government to offer in
evidence. The article disclosed the fact that petitioner had two prior
felony convictions and that he had once testified before a state legislative
committee that although he only had a high school diploma, which he
received through the mails for twenty-five dollars, he practiced medi-
cine and easily wrote and passed prescriptions for dangerous drugs.
The trial judge learned that seven jurors had seen and read at least
one of the articles, but denied petitioner's motion for a mistrial on the
grounds that each of the seven had told the judge individually that he
would not be influenced by the articles, that he felt no prejudice towards
the defendant, and that he could decide the case only on the evidence
in the record.
In reversing the conviction and granting a new trial, the Supreme
Court said:
We have here the exposure of jurors to information of a character which the trial
judge ruled was so prejudicial it could not be directly offered as evidence. The pre-
judice to the defendant is almost certain to be as great when that evidence reaches the
jury through news accounts as when it is part of the prosecution's evidence.
It may indeed be greater for it is then not tempered by protective procedures. 88
The significance of Marshall lies in the fact that a criminal convic-
33. 384 U.S. 333 (1966).
34. 381 U.S. 532 (1965).
35. The concurring opinion of Finley, J., begins at -, 483 P.2d at 614.
36. 360 U.S. 310 (1959).
37. The provision under which Marshall was convicted was 21 U.S.C. § 331
(k) (1970), which prohibits the misbranding of drugs.
38. 360 U.S. 310, 312-13.
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tion was reversed for the first time on the basis of prejudice to the jury
without any showing of actual prejudice. The new rule that emerged
was that since evidence of a prior conviction was inadmissible at trial,
a showing that such information reached the jury from extrajudicial
sources was prejudicial per se, and no actual prejudice need be shown
to upset a conviction under such circumstances. Statements by jurors
that they read but would not be influenced by out-of-court prejudicial
information were no longer considered to be a conclusive indication of
impartiality. At this point, however, the Marshall rule was only binding
on federal courts.39
In Janko v. United States,40 the Supreme Court, without comment, re-
versed Janko's conviction for tax evasion and reaffirmed the Marshall
rule to the extent that the burden is not on the defendant to show
actual prejudice when it is shown that matter of a prejudicial nature
did in fact reach the jury before rendering of the verdict. 41  This ap-
pears to be the rule today.
Irvin v. Dowd represents the first time the Supreme Court overturned
a state conviction on the premise that the defendant had been denied a
fair trial by reason of prejudicial pre-trial publicity.42  In Irvin, de-
fendant was charged with committing six murders in Vanderburgh
County. Shortly after defendant's arrest, press releases were issued by
law enforcement officials which stated that defendant had confessed to
all six murders. The press releases were given such intensive publicity
that the counsel appointed to defend the alleged murderer asked for and
was granted a change of venue to Gibson County. Alleging that the
widespread and inflammatory publicity against the defendant had in-
fected the residents of Gibson County as well, defense counsel asked for
a second change of venue. The motion was denied, the trial conducted,
and the defendant was found guilty of murder and sentenced to death.
39. Id. at 313. The Court indicated that they were granting a new trial in the
exercise of their supervisory power to formulate and apply proper standards for
enforcement of criminal law in federal courts. The cases of Bruno v. United
States, 308 U.S. 287 (1939) and McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332 (1942)
were cited as giving them the authority to do so.
40. 366 U.S. 716 (1961).
41. See, e.g., United States v. Milanovich, 303 F.2d 626, 629-30 (1962), for a
discussion of who has the burden of showing prejudice in such situations.
42. 366 U.S. 717 (1961). The Court was faced with a classic case of jury
prejudice in a state criminal trial in the case of Shephard v. Florida, 341 U.S. 5
(1951), but chose to reverse the conviction on other grounds. In a concurring
opinion, Mr. Justice Jackson seemed disdained that the Court passed up such a
golden opportunity to lay down the rule that where a jury trial in a state court is
so permeated with hostility toward the accused, no actual prejudice need be
1972] 829CASE NOTES
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The Indiana Supreme Court upheld the conviction, 43 and a writ of
habeas corpus was denied by the federal district court44 and affirmed
by the federal court of appeals. 4 5 The Supreme Court of the United
States reversed the conviction, vacated the denial of the writ, and re-
manded the case for further proceedings to the district court, affording
the state a reasonable time to retry the defendant. 46
A primary issue in the case was whether statements by the jurors
that they would be fair and impartial to the defendant in spite of
having knowledge of facts which tended to show his guilt were con-
clusive evidence of impartiality. The Court's comments on this point
are noteworthy:
The [jury] panel consisted of 430 persons. The court itself excused 268 of those
on challenges for cause as having fixed opinions as to the guilt of petitioner; 103
were excused because of conscientious objection to the imposition of the death pen-
alty; 20, the maximum allowed, were peremptorily challenged by petitioner and 10
by the State; 12 persons and two alternates were selected as jurors and the rest were
excused on personal grounds ...
• ..Eight out of 12 thought petitioner was guilty. With such an opinion permeat-
ing their minds, it would be difficult to say that each could exclude this preconcep-
tion of guilt from his deliberations. The influence that lurks in an opinion once
formed is so persistent that it unconsciously fights detachment from the mental proc-
esses of the average man. . . . No doubt each juror was sincere when he said that
he would be fair and impartial to petitioner, but the psychological impact requiring
such a declaration before one's fellows is often its father. Where so many, so many
times, admitted prejudice, such a statement of impartiality can be given little
weight. As one of the jurors put it, "You can't forget what you hear and see." 47
Mr. Justice Frankfurter, in a concurring opinion, 48 made reference to
the frequency and magnitude of this type of problem, 49 and seemed
disturbed that the Court would not undertake a review of all state
prosecutions achieved in this manner.50 In concluding he stated:
This Court has not yet decided that the fair admission of criminal justice must be
subordinated to another safeguard of our constitutional system-freedom of the press,
properly conceived. The Court has not yet decided that, while convictions must be
shown to upset any conviction obtained under those circumstances. Evidently, the
Court was just not ready at that time to take such a big step, so they used dis-
crimination in selection of the jury as a grounds for reversal.
43. Irvin v. State, 236 Ind. 384, 139 N.E.2d 898 (1957).
44. Irvin v. Dowd, 153 F. Supp. 531 (N.D. Ind., 1957).
45. Irvin v. Dowd, 271 F.2d 552 (7th Cir., 1959).
46. Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 730 (1961).
47. Id. at 727-28.
48. Id. at 729.
49. Supra note 14.
50. 366 U.S. 717, 730.
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reversed and miscarriages of justice result because the minds of jurors or potential
jurors were poisoned, the poisoner is constitutionally protected in plying his trade.5 1
In Rideau v. Louisiana,52 petitioner was arrested for armed robbery
of a bank, kidnapping of three employees as hostages and the subse-
quent murder of one of the hostages. After his arrest, a motion picture
film with sound track was made of an interview between petitioner and
a law enforcement official in the jail. The "interview" was twenty
minutes in length and consisted of interrogation of the suspect and his
admission to the crimes. The taped interview was shown over the
local television station that same day, and on the two succeeding days.
Subsequently, petitioner was arraigned for the crimes and the trial
commenced nearly two months later. A motion for a change of venue
was denied, and the trial which followed resulted in a conviction of
petitioner and a sentence of death on the murder charge. The filmed
"confession" was not admitted into evidence at the trial, but it was
shown that at least three members of the jury had seen and heard the
televised "interview," and that two members of the jury were deputy
sheriffs of the parish.
The Supreme Court reversed the conviction on the grounds that peti-
tioner's constitutional guarantee of due process had been violated. The
Court said that:
Under our Constitution's guarantee of due process, a person accused of committing
a crime is vouchsafed basic minimal rights. Among these are the right to counsel,
the right to plead not guilty, and the right to be tried in a courtroom before a judge.
Yet in this case the people of Calcasieu Parish saw and heard, not once but
three times, a "trial" of Rideau in a jail, presided over by a sheriff, where there
was no lawyer to advise Rideau of his right to stand mute. 53
It should be pointed out that no actual prejudice on the part of the
jurors was shown.
In a dissenting opinion, 54 Mr. Justice Clark indicated that if the case
had been tried in a federal court, over which the Supreme Court exer-
cises supervisory powers, he would have voted to reverse the conviction
on the ground that it is not within the province of law enforcement offi-
cers to actively cooperate in activities which tend to make more difficult
the achievement of impartial justice. He agreed with the majority that
one is deprived of due process of law when he is tried in an environ-
ment so permeated with hostility that judicial proceedings can be "but
51. Id.
52. 377 U.S. 723 (1963).
53. Id. at 726-27.
54. Id. at 727 (Mr. Justice Harlan joined in the dissent).
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a hollow formality."5 5  But in view of the fact that the trial was con-
ducted nearly two months after the "interview" was broadcast, he did
not feel that the record showed the trial to have been infected by the
adverse publicity. He emphasized that the conviction in Irvin was over-
turned with the caveat that:
It is not required . . . that the jurors be totally ignorant of the facts and issues in-
volved. In these days of swift, widespread and diverse methods of communication,
an important case can be expected to arouse the interest of the public in the vicinity,
and scarcely any of those best qualified to serve as jurors will not have formed some
impression or opinion as to the merits of the case. This is particularly true in crimi-
nal cases. To hold that the mere existence of any preconceived notion as to the guilt
or innocence of an accused, without more, is sufficient to rebut the presumption of
a prospective juror's impartiality would be to establish an impossible standard. 5 6
In Estes v. Texas,57 petitioner had been indicted by a Texas grand
jury for swindling. On the trial date, a hearing was held to consider
a motion by petitioner to prevent telecasting, radio broadcasting, and
news photography at the trial. The motion was denied, but a con-
tinuance of one month was allowed. The hearing itself, conducted in
the presence of some witnesses and veniremen later released, was car-
ried live on television and radio, and photography was allowed.
During the continuance, a booth was constructed in the rear of the
courtroom for use by the news media once the trial began. During
the actual trial, only the opening and closing arguments of the state
and the return of the jury's verdict were broadcast live by the media.
Petitioner was convicted of the crimes charged.
In reversing the conviction by a five-to-four vote, 58 the majority felt
that the televising over petitioner's objections of the courtroom proceed-
ings, in which there was widespread interest, was inherently invalid as
infringing the right to a fair trial guaranteed by the due process clause
of the fourteenth amendment. The Rideau decision was expressly fol-
lowed 59 in so far as it held that due process is lacking whether or not
isolatable prejudice can be demonstrated whenever the procedure fol-
55. Id. at 729.
56. Id. at 730-31.
57. 381 U.S. 532 (1965).
58. Mr. Justice Clark wrote the majority opinion (at 534). Mr. Chief Justice
Warren wrote a concurring opinion and was joined by JJ. Douglas and Goldberg(at 552). Mr. Justice Harlan wrote a separate concurring opinion (at 587). Mr.
Justice Stewart wrote a dissenting opinion and was joined by JJ. Black, Brennan,
and White (at 601). Mr. Justice White wrote his own dissenting opinion as well,
and was joined by Mr. Justice Brennan (at 615).
59. 381 U.S. 532, 544.
832 [Vol. XXI
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lowed by a state involves the probability that prejudice to the accused
will result. 0
The Court was careful to emphasize that the decision only limited
live broadcasting by the various media, and did not preclude the at-
tendance at trial of representatives of the media who could report on
the events later. The Court pointed out that this rule does not dis-
criminate against television and radio and favor the newspaper media.
They said:
Nor can the courts be said to discriminate where they permit the newspaper reporter
access to the courtroom. The television and radio reporter has the same privilege.
All are entitled to the same rights as the general public. The news reporter is not
permitted to bring his typewriter or printing press. When the advances in these arts
permit reporting by printing press or by television without their present hazards to a
fair trial we will have another case.61
This point was later reaffirmed when the Court said:
It is true that the public has the right to be informed as to what occurs in its courts,
but reporters of all media, including television, are always present if they wish to be
and are plainly free to report whatever occurs in open court through their respective
media.0 2
In none of the dissenting opinions were televised trials advocated.
However, the dissenting justices seemed to feel that the Court was act-
ing too hastily by imposing a blanket constitutional prohibition on tele-
vision coverage of trials. As Mr. Justice Stewart commented:
I think that the introduction of television into a courtroom is, at least in the present
state of the art, an extremely unwise policy. It invites many constitutional risks, and
it detracts from the inherent dignity of a courtroom. But I am unable to escalate this
personal view into a per se constitutional rule. 63
Sheppard v. Maxwell04 is considered to be the leading example of
the extremes to which the fair trial-free speech controversy can be car-
ried. The principle that identifiable prejudice to the rights of a crim-
60. Id. at 544-50. The Court therein examined the four ways that televising
proceedings can result in unfairness in some detail, which can be summarized as:
(1) improper influence on jurors by emphasizing the notoriety of the trial and
affecting their impartial judgment, detracting their attention, facilitating their
viewing of selected parts of the proceedings, and improperly influencing potential
jurors thus jeopardizing the fairness of new trials; (2) impairing the testimony of
witnesses as by causing some to be frightened and others to overstate their testi-
mony; (3) distracting judges generally and exerting an adverse psychological ef-
fect particularly on judges who are elected; (4) imposing pressures on the defendant
and intruding into the confidential attorney-client relationship.
61. Id. at 540.
62. Id. at 541-42 (emphasis added).
63. Id. at 601-02.
64. 384 U.S. 333 (1966).
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inally accused need not be shown if the totality of the circumstances
raises the probability of prejudice was extended to "trial by newspaper"
situations by this decision. In view of the fact that Sheppard repre-
sents the first real attempt on the part of the Supreme Court to lay
down some definite guidelines for lower courts faced with this prob-
lem, a closer look at the facts leading to the decision is warranted.
In 1954 Dr. Sam Sheppard's wife was murdered. Sheppard was ar-
rested for the murder three weeks later. Nearly three months elapsed
before the commencement of the trial, and during the entire pre-trial
period vicious and incriminating publicity about the accused and the
murder made the case notorious. The news media during this period
frequently aired charges and countercharges against Sheppard which
were completey unrelated to the murder charge.
One of the more distressing events which occurred prior to trial was
a televised three-day inquest in which Sheppard was examined without
the aid of counsel before an audience of several hundred spectators in
a local gymnasium. More than three weeks before the trial, news-
papers published the names of prospective jurors, causing them to re-
ceive letters and telephone calls about the case.
The actual trial began two weeks before a hotly-contested election in
which the chief prosecutor and the trial judge were candidates for judge-
ships. During the trial newsmen were allowed free reign in the small
courtroom, in the corridors and elsewhere in and around the court-
house. Twenty reporters were assigned seats in close proximity to the
jury and the counsel tables, precluding privacy between Sheppard and
his counsel. A broadcasting station was assigned space adjacent to the
jury room. Prior to their deliberations, the jury was not sequestered
and had access to all news media, though the trial judge on a few
occasions suggested that they not expose themselves to extrajudicial
comment on the case. Though the jury was sequestered during the five
days of their deliberations, they were allowed to make inadequately
supervised phone calls during that period.
Much of the publicity given to the case throughout the trial involved
incriminating matters not introduced in evidence, and the jurors were
thrust into the role of celebrities. The trial judge on more than one
occasion announced that neither he nor anyone else could restrict the
prejudicial news coverage of the proceedings. For this reason, he took
no effective steps to control the massive publicity or even the conduct of
the media representatives in the courtroom itself. Under all these cir-
cumstances, Sheppard was convicted of murder.
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After a twelve-year battle in the lower courts, during which time Shep-
pard remained in prison, the case was heard by the Supreme Court of
the United States. The conviction was reversed and Sheppard was or-
dered released from custody unless retried within a reasonable time.
After stating the facts in the decision, the Court made the following
comments:
A responsible press has always been regarded as the handmaiden of effective judicial
administration, especially in the criminal field. Its function in this regard is docu-
mented by an impressive record of service over several centuries. The press does
not simply publish information about trials but guards against the miscarriage of jus-
tice by subjecting the police, prosecutors, and judicial processes to extensive public
scrutiny and criticism. This Court, therefore, has been unwilling to place any di-
rect limitations on the freedom traditionally exercised by the news media for, "[w]hat
transpires in the courtroom is public property." The "unqualified prohibitions laid
down by the framers were intended to give the liberty of the press. . . the broadest
scope that could be countenanced in an orderly society." And where there was "no
threat or menace to the integrity of the trial," we have consistently required that the
press have a free hand, even though we sometimes deplored the sensationalism ....
"[Llegal trials are not like elections, to be won through the use of the meeting hall,
the radio, and the newspaper." ...
.. [N]o one [should be] punished for a crime without "a charge fairly made
and fairly tried in a public tribunal free of prejudice, passion, excitement, and
tyrannical power." 65
Applying all this to the case before the Court, the majority said:
While we cannot say that Sheppard was denied due process by the judge's refusal to
take precautions against the influence of pretrial publicity alone, the [trial] court's
later ruling must be considered against the setting in which the trial was held. In
light of this background, we believe that the arrangements made by the judge with
the news media caused Sheppard to be deprived of that "judicial serenity and calm to
which [he] was entitled." The fact is that bedlam reigned at the courthouse during
the trial.66
Taking cognizance of the fact that the trial judge had on several
occasions said that he was powerless to control the prejudicial public-
ity during the trial, the Court listed several alternatives that were
available which could have been used to avoid the "carnival atmosphere"
of the trial: 67 The judge could have adopted stricter rules for the use
of the courtroom by newsmen; 68 he could have limited the number of
newsmen and more closely supervised their courtroom conduct; 69 he
65. Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 350 (1966).
66. Id. at 354-55.
67. Id. at 358-62.
68. Id. at 358.
69. Id.
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could have insulated the witnesses from extrajudicial influence; 70 he
could have controlled the release of leads, information and gossip to
the press by police officers, witnesses and counsel; 71 he could have
proscribed extrajudicial statements by any lawyer, witness, party or
court official divulging prejudicial matters; 72 and he could have re-
quested the appropriate city and county officials to regulate release of
information by their employees. 73
The Court's final comments included several more safeguards that
could have been taken advantage of by the trial judge:
[Wihere there is a reasonable likelihood that prejudicial news prior to trial will
prevent a fair trial, the judge should continue the case until the threat abates, or
transfer it to another county not so permeated with publicity. In addition, sequestra-
tion of the jury was something the judge should have raised sua sponte with counsel.
If publicity during the proceedings threatens the fairness of the trial, a new trial
should be ordered. But we must remember that reversals are but palliatives; the cure
lies in those remedial measures that will prevent the prejudice at its inception. The
courts must take such steps by rule and regulation that will protect their processes
from prejudicial outside interference. Neither prosecutors, counsel for defense, the
accused, witnesses, court staff nor enforcement officers coming under the jurisdiction
of the court should be permitted to frustrate its function. Collaboration between
counsel and the press as to information affecting the fairness of a criminal trial is
not only subject to regulation, but is highly censurable and worthy of disciplinary
measures.
74
With respect to the Sperry opinion, the single most significant point
to be gleaned from Sheppard is the fact that only the conduct of the
news media in the courtroom itself was sought to be regulated; what
the news media published about a pending trial and what a trial judge
could do when faced with an uncooperative press were matters specif-
ically excluded by the Sheppard decision. 75  Although the news media
70. Id. at 359.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 361 (emphasis added).
73. Id. at 362.
74. Id. at 363 (emphasis added).
75. The Sheppard Court said at 357-58: "The court's fundamental error is
compounded by the holding that it lacked power to control the publicity about the
trial. From the very inception of the proceedings the judge announced that neither
he nor anyone else could restrict prejudicial news accounts. . . . Since he viewed
the news media as his target, the judge never considered other means that are often
utilized to reduce the appearance of prejudicial material and to protect the jury from
outside influence. We conclude that these procedures would have been sufficient to
guarantee Sheppard a fair trial and so do not consider what sanctions might be
available against a recalcitrant press." [emphasis added].
Later at 362-63, the Court said: "Of course, there is nothing that proscribes the
press from reporting events that transpire in the courtroom." [emphasis added].
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may often be the vehicle of abuse to one's right to a fair trial in any
given case (and this was certainly the situtation in Sheppard), the
trend since Sheppard seems to be that the sources of prejudicial infor-
mation are limited more readily than direct limitations on the news
media's right to speak freely and write about what is seen and heard
in an open court proceeding. 76 Courts faced with this problem since
Sheppard seem to be adopting this interpretation.
United States v. Tijerina77 was a criminal prosecution in a federal
district court. Because of the circumstances surrounding the case, the
trial judge issued a pre-trial order precluding publicity or comment about
the case by counsel, parties and witnesses. Two of the defendants,
while still under the pre-trial order, made statements about the pending
action, the court and the trial judge at a convention three days before
the trial was to begin. They were called in before the court and cited
for contempt.
On appeal from the contempt conviction, defendants' primary conten-
tion was that their first amendment right of freedom of speech had
been abridged by the pre-trial order. The appeals court affirmed the
conviction, and cited Sheppard as authority for the proposition that a
pre-trial order proscribing extra-judicial statements by any lawyer, party,
witness or court official was not only valid, but was the responsibility
of the trial judge in assuring that a fair trial be enjoyed by all parties
involved. 78 The defendants argued that in a conflict between fair trial
and free speech the latter has always been given a preferred position.
The court denied the validity of that contention, citing the Estes de-
dision. 79
76. One indication that this is a proper interpretation of the Sheppard decision
is that the final draft of the Reardon Report, discussed below, notes 93-98 and
accompanying text, which was adopted by the ABA after the rendering of Sheppard,
devotes three-quarters of its recommendations to control over attorneys, law en-
forcement officers, judges, judicial employees and the proceedings themselves. Only
one section of the report deals with the use of the contempt power, and then only
when damaging statements are "willfully designed ... to affect the outcome of
the trial, and seriously (threaten) to have such an effect." For the complete
provision see Reardon Report, Part IV § 4.1(a)(i), Adopted Draft (1968).
77. 412 F.2d 661 (10th Cir. 1969), cert. denied 396 U.S. 990 (1969). See also
Annot., 5 A.L.R. Fed. 948 (1970).
78. 412 F.2d 661, 667.
79. Id. The court reiterated the following which was said by the Estes Court,
381 U.S. 532, 540-41: "We have always held that the atmosphere essential to the
preservation of a fair trial-the most essential of all freedoms-must be main-
tained at all costs. Our approach has been through rules, contempt proceedings and
reversal of convictions obtained under unfair conditions. Here the remedy is clear
and certain of application and it is our duty to continue to enforce the principles
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In Worcester Telegram and Gazette, Inc. v. Commonwealth80 a news-
paper publisher and a reporter were found in contempt of court for
publishing an article which commented on a pending criminal trial.
The article appeared the evening of the first day of the trial, and dis-
closed that one of the four defendants was at that time serving a prison
sentence. When the trial commenced the following morning, the de-
fense asked that the jurors be polled to see if any of them had read
the article. It was determined that half of the jurors had seen the
article, and a motion for a mistrial was granted.
On appeal, the contempt conviction was reversed on the grounds that
even though the article admittedly prejudiced the rights of at least one
of the defendants, 8' the declaration of a mistrial did not by itself man-
date a finding of contempt for those responsible for the publication of
the article since it was shown that the "petitioners . . . had no 'willfull
design' to affect the trial. ' '8 2
Although there was no pretrial order involved in Worcester, the re-
sult does show the extreme to which one post-Sheppard court went to
avoid a direct restraint on the news media limiting discussion of a
pending case by exercise of the contempt power. Here was a case
where the article in question was admittedly in gross interference with
the defendant's rights to a fair trial,8 3 and yet, since the publisher and
reporter had no "willfull design" to affect the outcome of the trial,
the court refused to allow their contempt conviction to stand.8 4
that from time immemorial have proven efficacious and necessary to a fair trial"
(emphasis added). An identical result was reached in Hamilton v. Municipal
Court, 270 Cal. App. 2d 797, 76 Cal. Rptr. 168 (1969), cert. denied 396 U.S. 985
(1969). See also Annot., 33 A.L.R.3d 1041 (1970).
80. 354 Mass. 578, 238 N.E.2d 861 (1968). See also 33 A.L.R.3d 1116
(1970).
81. 354 Mass. 578, 579-80, 238 N.E.2d 861, 862. The fact that the defendants
had been prejudiced by the article was even stipulated to by the assistant district at-
torney who was prosecuting the case.
82. Id. at 582, 238 N.E.2d at 864.
83. "Gross interference" to the rights of the defendants was the phrase used
by the court itself, which then reversed the contempt conviction of those who
were responsible for this "gross interference." Id. at 580, 238 N.E.2d at 863.
84. In the Worcester case, the Superior Court of Massachusetts expressly
adopted the "willfull design" theory of the Reardon Report, which will be dis-
cussed below. But see Tauro, Fair Trial-Free Press Revisited, 55 A.B.A.J. 417(1969), where the Chief Justice of the Massachusetts Superior Court warns the
news media not to abuse this liberality by the courts. To do so, he warned, may
cause the Supreme Court of the United States to reverse its past decisions which
seem to favor freedom of the press over the right to a fair trial when any attempt
has been made to find the press in contempt for interference with the right to a
fair trial.
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The state of affairs indicated in the cases above has in recent years
generated an unprecedented amount of serious discussion on the consti-
tutional, social and even economic ramifications of a single problem;
that is, the seemingly inherent conflict which arises whenever an at-
tempt is made to accommodate an accused's right to a fair trial simul-
taneously with the news media's right to keep the public informed.
As a direct result of the findings of the Warren Commission,8 5 sev-
eral major studies, financed and directed by various legal groups,
were undertaken to consider the problem and to come up with some
practical solutions therefor. 86 One of the three, the Reardon Report
is by far the one that has received the most attention. The standards
set out in this report, adopted by the American Bar Association's
(ABA) House of Delegates in 1968,87 are merely recommendations
which the committee has proposed for adoption by the appropriate
authorities in the various jurisdictions.
In light of the Sperry decision, it is interesting to note that an entire
section of the Reardon Report was devoted to the use of the contempt
power in a case where extra-judicial information has been disseminated
during criminal proceedings.88 Under the standards, use of the con-
tempt power by a court is severely limited, one of the more stringent
requirements for its use being that the extra-judicial statements be wil-
fully designed to affect the outcome of the trial and that they seriously
threaten to have such an effect.89 Although the Reardon Report only
represents a set of recommendations and of course has no binding ef-
85. REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON THE ASSASSINATION OF PRESI-
DENT JOHN F. KENNEDY (U.S. Government Printing Office: Washington, D.C.)
1964. The Commission and the report took their name from then Chief Justice of
the Supreme Court, Earl Warren, who was appointed to lead the investigation of
J.F.K.'s assassination.
86. The results of these three studies also got their names from judges who
directed the studies. They were: (1) ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON FAIR TRIAL AND
FREE PRESS, ABA PROJECT ON MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE,
STANDARDS RELATING TO FAIR TRIAL AND FREE PRESS-TENTATIVE DRAFT (1966),
APPROVED DRAFT (1968) [the Reardon Report]; (2) COMMITTEE ON THE OPERA-
TION OF THE JURY SYSTEM, JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, REPORT
OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE OPERATION OF THE JURY SYSTEM ON THE "FREE PRESS-
FAIR TmIAL" ISSUE (Sept., 1968) [the Kaufman Report]; (3) ASSOCIATION OF THE
BAR OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK. SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON RADIO, TELEVISION, AND
THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE. FREEDOM OF THE PRESS AND FAiR TRIAL, FINAL
REPORT wrrH RECOMMENDATIONS (1967) [the Medina Report].
87. The Reardon Report, supra note 95, Approved Draft (1968).
88. Reardon Report, Part IV.
89. Id. See also note 93 supra.
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fect on any of the various courts, it does carry considerable weight in
legal circles. 90
Interest in the fair trial-free speech controversy, however, has by no
means been limited to studies conducted by bar association groups or
discussions at judicial conferences. There have been Congressional
hearings on the matter; 91 several books and numerous articles have con-
sidered the problem;9 2 model statutes have been proposed by legal
writers seeking a solution to the dilemma;93 and the United States Su-
preme Court, in little more than a decade has handed down six major
decisions each of which dealt with various aspects of the fair trial-free
speech controversy.9 4
The majority in the Sperry decision did not refer to the Reardon
Report or its "willfull design" theory. They did not even mention the
Sheppard decision, in spite of its importance in this area. Instead,
they chose to reverse the contempt convictions of the reporters on the
ground that a prior restraint (such as the pre-trial order issued by the
trial judge) on the right of the news media to report those events which
occur in open court is patently invalid. Disobedience of such an order,
they said, could not support a judgment of contempt. They went no
further.
The concurring justices in Sperry, however, reached the same result
(i.e., reversal of the contempt conviction) using a different route. A
more sympathetic attitude was taken towards the trial judge who issued
the order, on the grounds that he was only making a sincere effort to
assure the defendants in the murder trial a hearing free from prejudi-
cial influences. They believed that the directives by the Supreme
Court in Sheppard influenced the trial judge in his initial decision to
90. For a good objective examination of the Reardon Report, see Comment,
Legal Aspects of the Fair Trial-Free Press Controversy: The Reardon Report
Considered, 48 NEB. L. REV. 1045 (1969). For a discussion of the Reardon
Report from the viewpoint of the news media, see Ragan, Fair Trial With A
Free Press: The Reardon Report Revisited, 37 TENN. L. REv. 215 (1969) (address
given by newspaper publisher on June 12, 1969, at a seminar on News Media
sponsored by the Tenn. Bar Assoc. at its 88th Annual Convention).
91. Hearings on S. 290 Before a Subcomm. on Const'l. Rights and the Subcomm.
on Improvements in Judicial Machinery of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary,
89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965).
92. See, e.g., 33 A.L.R.3d 1116, 1118, note 5, for a comprehensive list of re-
cent works on this problem.
93. See, e.g., An Act To Prevent The Dissemination Of Prejudicial Publicity, set
out in Comment, The Case Against Trial By Newspaper: Analysis and Proposal,
57 Nw. U.L. REV. 217 (1962).
94. Supra notes 39-81 and accompanying text.
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issue a pre-trial order. They indicated that it was an oversimplification
to say that the exercise of the freedom of the press by the news media
is absolute once a trial has begun and events occurring in public and in
open court are involved. In other words, they could foresee situations
where reporters could be found in contempt for reporting on events
taking place in an open court proceeding.
Using their approach the prior restraint problem could be avoided
because members of the news media could only be found in contempt
if it could be clearly shown that what they had written did in fact af-
fect the outcome of the proceedings. This argument is based on the
premise that although pre-publication censorship is not constitutionally
permissible, post-publication accountability is constitutionally support-
able. a5
The concurring justices would reverse here because it was never
shown that the jury even knew the article in question existed, much less
that they had read or had been influenced by it in their deliberations.
This approach does not conflict with the rule that prejudice need no
longer be shown if the totality of the circumstances indicates a prejudi-
cial atmosphere per se, since such circumstances did not exist in Sperry.
The extremely prejudicial circumstances evident in such cases as Estes
and Sheppard just were not there.
Thus, the question of whether or not the article had influenced the
jury to such an extent that it could then be said that the reporters had
abused their freedom of speech, remained subject to proof. The re-
porters, however, should not be subjected to a new hearing to deter-
mine this question of fact remaining unanswered, since no clear prece-
dent controlled this case and fundamental principles of fairness required
that application of this new rule should be reserved for application in
future cases. 06
95. Wash. Const. art. I, § 5. Note that the state constitutional provision indi-
cates that one is guaranteed freedom of speech but is responsible for the abuse of
that right.
96. 79 Wash. 2d at -, 483 P.2d at 627, where the concurring justice said:
"As to any future cases of this nature, it seems prudent to emphasize that this
court should have no reservations in applying the principle or standard relative to
post-publication accountability. The comments, the discussion, and guidelines in-
dicated herein should provide notice to all concerned . . . that post-publication
accountability . . . will be the applicable principle or standard in future cases of
this nature. . . . [Tihe standard indicates or provides . . . an appropriate and
necessary solution of the sensitive and delicate problem of conflict between the
constitutional concepts of free press and fair trial. Namely, the suggested solution
would be based upon actual proof of tangible harm rather than upon mere sus-
picion, speculation, and conjecture. Such a solution avoids the problem of any
prior restraint or censorship of the news media."
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It is submitted that a thorough examination of the Sheppard decision
and the decisions which have attempted to interpret it, indicates that
both views expressed in Sperry are partly correct and partly incorrect.
That prior restraints on the rights of the news media are invalid in
such situations appears to be the rule today. The Court in Shep-
pard expressly excluded any guidelines as to what a court should do
when faced with a recalcitrant press. 97 In the same decision, however,
the Court strongly advised that courts faced with the fair trial-free
speech problem should by rule and regulation stop the flow of prejudicial
information to the press at its source; that is, limit dissemination of such
matter to the press by parties, counsel, court officials and others ac-
tively participating in the judicial proceedings.98 The Tijerina case, de-
cided after Sheppard indicates that prior restraints on the first amend-
ment freedom of speech are valid when directed at such persons, if a
fair trial will thereby result.
The fact that certiorari was denied in Sperry indicates that the Su-
preme Court was satisfied with the interpretation given Sheppard. This
would seem to indicate that, while the Court is willing to allow some limita-
tions on the first amendment freedom of speech, it is not yet ready to
allow such limitations when the news media is involved. In other words,
prior restraints on first amendment freedoms are no longer per se un-
constitutional when they are directed at parties other than representatives
of the news media, if a fair trial is thereby insured to one accused of
a crime.
It seems that the Court would like to see all other possible solutions
to the fair trial-free speech controversy fully explored before limitations
are put on the freedom of the news media to keep the public in-
formed. 9 Whether or not the news media will relinquish this seemingly
favored position through abuse and cause the Supreme Court to reverse
this apparent trend remains to be seen.
Bruce Zolna
97. See note 82 supra.
98. See note 81 supra, and accompanying text.
99. See note 81 supra, and accompanying text for the "other possible solu-
tions" as outlined by the Sheppard Court.
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